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Abstract
Cooperation in social systems such as tax honesty is of central importance in our modern societies. However, we know
little about cognitive and neural processes driving decisions to evade or pay taxes. This study focuses on the impact of
perceived tax authority and examines the mental chronometry mirrored in ERP data allowing a deeper understanding
about why humans cooperate in tax systems. We experimentally manipulated coercive and legitimate authority and
studied its impact on cooperation and underlying cognitive (experiment 1, 2) and neuronal (experiment 2) processes.
Experiment 1 showed that in a condition of coercive authority, tax payments are lower, decisions are faster and
participants report more rational reasoning and enforced compliance, however, less voluntary cooperation than in a
condition of legitimate authority. Experiment 2 confirmed most results, but did not find a difference in payments or self-
reported rational reasoning. Moreover, legitimate authority led to heightened cognitive control (expressed by increased
MFN amplitudes) and disrupted attention processing (expressed by decreased P300 amplitudes) compared to coercive au-
thority. To conclude, the neuronal data surprisingly revealed that legitimate authority may led to higher decision conflict
and thus to higher cognitive demands in tax decisions than coercive authority.
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Introduction
Social systems are characterized by individuals who cooperate
in the provision of non-excludable public goods, or defect and
free-ride (Dawes, 1980). Tax honesty and tax evasion represent
highly relevant examples of such cooperation. They do not only
impact the possibilities of modern societies to provide schools
or roads, but can also fuel social turbulences based on perceived
injustice, if some taxpayers are perceived to systematically
avoid paying their fair share of taxes. To uphold cooperation
in these fragile systems, modern societies employ centralized
institutions who wield harsh coercive or soft legitimate author-
ity to ensure individual cooperation (Raven et al., 1998; Turner,
2005; Gu¨th et al., 2007; Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011).
Empirical evidence shows that the two qualities of authority
lead to different motivations to cooperate (Kastlunger et al.,
2012; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hofmann et al., 2017), but rarely dif-
fer in their positive effect on cooperation (Alm et al., 1992;
Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Isakov and Rand, 2012; Hofmann et al.,
2014; Hartl et al., 2015).
Coercive and legitimate authority promote cooperation origi-
nating from different motivational states (Koslowsky et al., 2001;
Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015). Coercive authority based
on control and punishment is assumed to fuel mistrust (Mulder
et al., 2006), to be perceived as ferocious and unfair (Mossholder
et al., 2009), and to induce calculative cost-benefit analyses
(Kirchler, 2007), which frame the decision to cooperate as a busi-
ness decision rather than as an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel
and Messick, 1999). Thus, the decision to cooperate might be-
come a deliberate rational decision about one’s own egoistic
utility and societal goals become less salient. Consequently, co-
ercive authority is seen to cause resistance, reactance (Brehm,
1966) and negative emotional arousal (Coricelli et al., 2010), and
it enforces motivation to comply out of feared penalization
(Frey, 1997; Kirchler et al., 2008). In contrast, legitimate authority
is based on acceptance, appreciation, perceived expertise and
information provision (Raven et al., 1998; Gangl et al., 2015). It is
assumed to increase trust and fairness (Tyler and Fagan, 2008;
Hechter, 2009) and might be perceived as the communication of
a widely accepted rule by community members (Bendor and
Mookherjee, 1990), or as an instrument to establish fairness and
a social norm of cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).
Legitimate authority might induce moral pressure and psycho-
logical stress (e.g. a conflict, Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Dulleck
et al., 2016) in response to the felt urge to reciprocate to legitim-
ate authority (Fehr et al., 1997). Legitimate authority might pro-
voke a deliberate conflict between self-interest and community
interests which, in turn, fosters a voluntary motivation to co-
operate (Tyler, 1997; Kirchler et al., 2008; Hofmann et al., 2014).
Thus, decisions about cooperation under coercive or legitimate
authority do reflect rational economic choices (Camerer, 2003)
and social motives of reciprocity or inequity aversion (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002). Although coercive and legitimate authority
are perceived so differently, their positive effects on cooperative
behavior do not seem to vary dramatically (Hartl et al., 2015).
Taxpaying can be considered as a highly relevant real life ex-
ample for cooperation in a social context. Tax behavior is fre-
quently investigated in laboratories. Referring to experimental
games, income, tax rates, audit probabilities and fine rates are
manipulated and tax payments over several tax filing trials are
registered as dependent variable (Mittone, 2006; Alm et al., 2010;
Hartl et al., 2015). Although a bulk of empirical studies on tax be-
havior has been published, studies on cognitive processes
underlying tax behavior are rare and neurophysiological in-
sights are missing.
We performed an event-related potentials (ERPs) study,
investigating how tax payment decisions are affected by differ-
ent types of centralized authorities. ERPs have been repeatedly
used to gain insights into social decision-making, with their
high temporal resolution enabling detailed insights into the
mental chronometry of decision-making. In particular, ampli-
tude variation of the Medial Frontal Negativity component
(MFN; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) has been investigated in
this regard. It is a negative scalp potential within 200–300 ms
after (feedback) stimulus onset at fronto-central electrodes,
with the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) and ventral stri-
atum as potential neuronal generators (Debener et al., 2005;
Becker et al., 2014). Generally, MFN amplitudes are more nega-
tive after unfavorable compared to favorable (Miltner et al.,
1997), unexpected compared to expected (Alexander and Brown,
2011; Pfabigan et al., 2011), and salient compared to insignificant
outcomes (Talmi et al., 2013). Moreover, MFN enhancement was
interpreted as a signal of enhanced cognitive control (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), which describes, among others,
the monitoring and regulation of response strategies, feedback
processing yielding strategy regulation and response conflict
(i.e. concurrent activation of incompatible response options;
Folstein and Van Petten, 2008). Taken together, MFN amplitude
variation reflects early and coarse stimulus evaluation proc-
esses (Yeung et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2006). Regarding social
decision-making, the MFN is usually observed in economic
games focusing on asset distribution, such as the Ultimatum
Game (UG; Gu¨th et al., 1982). There, MFN amplitude enhance-
ment indicates unfair compared to fair outcomes (Boksem and
De Cremer, 2010; Alexander and Brown, 2011; Alexopoulos et al.,
2012, 2013), concurrently also reflecting cognitive control.
Another ERP component frequently investigated during so-
cial decision-making is the P300. This positive-going component
peaks within 300–500 ms after (feedback) stimulus onset at pos-
terior electrodes (Polich, 2007). More pronounced P300 ampli-
tudes have been reported in response to a greater change in
evaluative stimulus categorization (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito
et al., 1998) and greater attention allocation (Polich, 2007). Larger
P300 amplitudes were found after positive compared to negative
outcomes (Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Pfabigan et al., 2015).
In UG studies, P300 amplitudes were also sensitive to outcome
fairness–usually larger after fair compared to unfair offers (Wu
et al., 2012; Qu et al., 2013).
We conducted two experiments introducing taxpaying in
two centralized institutional contexts. In the first experiment,
we collected behavioral data and reaction times while partici-
pants performed repeated fast tax decisions under coercive and
legitimate authority. In the second experiment, the tax para-
digm was slightly adapted to an individual assessment and
such that the speed of participants’ proceeding the tax decision
was reduced, to allow a more valid assessment of ERP data.
As in previous studies, we expected that in contrast to legit-
imate authority, coercive authority will lead to self-reported
enforced motivation to comply, low voluntary motivation to co-
operate (Kastlunger et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2014) and
enhanced rational decision-making and reactance than legitim-
ate authority (Brehm, 1966, Kirchler, 2007). Overall tax payments
should not differ between the authority conditions (Hartl et al.,
2015). For reaction times (experiment 1) and ERP data (experi-
ment 2) we tested two opposing hypotheses. On the one hand,
coercive authority might induce a more complex decision pro-
cess than legitimate authority. It provokes a comparatively
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effortful calculative cost-benefit analysis and deliberation about
possible ways to reduce the tax burden. Legitimate authority
might be perceived as a positive signal and thus produces a fast
response to spontaneously cooperate (Tenbrunsel and Messick,
1999; Kirchler, 2007). On the other hand, legitimate authority
might induce more complex cognitive processes than coercive
authority, as personal utility optimization motives might be in
conflict with the moral pressure to pursue societal goals.
Reciprocity towards the legitimate authority might elicit a cog-
nitive response conflict whereas coercive authority produces a
fast response to cooperate (Fehr et al., 1997). Reaction times
serve as indicator of cognitive effort and indicate whether cost-
benefit analysis induced by coercive authority or the heightened
response conflict induced by legitimate authority lead to more
complex, deliberate and, thus, slower decisions (Rubinstein,
2007). For the ERP data, we expected MFN enhancement to indi-
cate heightened cognitive control demands due to response
conflict either in the coercive or the legitimate context
(Botvinick et al., 2001). Enhanced P300 amplitudes should reflect
enhanced categorization demands and attentional processing
(Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito et al., 1998; Polich, 2007) in case either
coercive or legitimate authority induce a more complex decision
process. In addition, we explored the P2 component prior to the
MFN, which is indicative of arousal levels (Carretie´ et al., 2001)
and attention capture (Potts, 2004).
Experiment 1
Method
The following section describes the central methodological as-
pects of our study; additional methodological details are pro-
vided in Supplementary Material.
Sample
The sample consisted of 80 volunteers (38 men, 1 did not indi-
cate sex; Mage ¼ 24.89, SDage ¼ 6.48). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two taxpaying conditions (coercive authority
of tax administration followed by legitimate authority [n¼ 39],
or legitimate authority followed by coercive authority, [n¼ 41].
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki (7th revision, 2013) and local ethical guidelines for ex-
perimentation with human participants (including approval by
an institutional review board) at the Faculty of Psychology,
University of Vienna.
Procedure
Participants were asked to imagine being self-employed, earn-
ing money in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and paying
taxes (40% of their income) over several trials in a fictitious
country. They were informed that the tax administration would
conduct tax audits with a chance of 15%. In case of detected tax
evasion they would have to pay back the evaded amount plus a
fine of the same amount. Participants were informed that a ran-
domly chosen trial determinates their final remuneration for
participation. After the introduction to the rules of the tax
game, in counterbalanced order, 40 coercive and 40 legitimate
authority trials followed, presented on a PC. After introducing
the first authority, each trial started with the endowment of one
out of five incomes (each presented eight times per authority in
exactly the same sequence for all participants; the randomized
sequence was determined prior to the experiment) and the
presentation of 40% tax rate. Then participants decided how
much tax they wanted to pay. After 40 trials in the first country,
participants filled out the first self-report questionnaire.
Subsequently, they were told to move to another country with a
changed authority where they filed taxes during another 40 tri-
als, ending by filling out the second self-report questionnaire.
Participants were reminded of the respective authority manipu-
lation every 10th trial. Finally, one prior to the experiment ran-
domly selected trial determined the payment of all participants
based on their behavior in this trial. On average, individuals
earned e10.78.
Material
To manipulate authority, two scenarios were developed which
described tax administrations that basically work with harsh
controls and punishments (coercive authority) or with profes-
sional experts who support taxpayers filing their taxes (legitim-
ate authority). To allow a direct comparison of the effect of both
scenarios, a within-subjects design was used in which all par-
ticipants were presented with both scenarios, in counterbal-
anced order. A manipulation check revealed that the
centralized institutions were perceived as manipulated (see
Supplementary Material [1.1.3, 3] for material and details on the
manipulation check).
Tax behavior was assessed by averaging taxpaying decisions
over 40 tax filing trials. For each tax filing trial one out of five in-
comes (60.000 ECU, 70.000 ECU, 75.000 ECU, 85.000 ECU, or
90.000 ECU) was assigned to the participants. Participants read
the information about coercive or legitimate authority, their in-
come, and the tax rate until they choose to terminate the slide
by pressing key 1. Afterwards, participants were presented with
a slide with five possible tax amounts to pay corresponding to
0% (fully dishonest), 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% (fully honest) of
the tax due. This slide was presented until participants choose
one of the options via button press (keys 1–5, pre-assigned to
the respective percent value). The different income levels
ensured that participants varied the responses over the 40
trials.
Mean reaction times were assessed from the onset of the tax
amount screen until button press. For each trial, outliers (2.17%
of all data points) were discarded in case reaction times were
longer than the mean reaction time plus three times the stand-
ard deviation.
Self-reports were assessed with two identical question-
naires. Perception of coercive authority and legitimate authority
was assessed with the Interpersonal Authority Inventory
(Raven et al., 1998; Hofmann et al., 2014) adapted to our tax con-
text. Reactance was measured by the adapted Hong
Psychological Reactance Scale (Shen and Dillard, 2005).
Deliberate rational decision-making was measured by the
adapted Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini and Epstein,
1999). Enforced compliance was measured by the TAX-I
(Kirchler and Wahl, 2010), voluntary cooperation by items
adapted from the motivational posture scale capitulation
(Braithwaite, 2003). Response scales were 7-point Likert scales
(1–disagree, 7–agree). Items and their reliability scores are re-
ported in Supplementary Material (4).
Statistical analyses
To analyze the differential impact of the two centralized institu-
tions, 2 x 2 univariate analysis of variance with authority ma-
nipulation (coercive vs legitimate) as within-subject factors, and
order of manipulation (coercive followed by legitimate authority
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or vice versa) as between-subjects factor was performed, with
self-report, behavioral and reaction time data as dependent
variables. Effect sizes of significant results are specified with
partial eta squared (gp
2) and Cohen’s d; the alpha-level was set at
P< 0.05. In the following, we present only the significant results
of main effects. Detailed results and robustness checks are pre-
sented in Supplementary Material (1.1.4, 1.1.5).
Results
Self-report data. Self-reported enforced compliance was signifi-
cantly affected by the type of authority (F(1,77) ¼ 54.55, P < 0.001,
gp
2 ¼ 0.42). As Figure 1 shows, enforced compliance was higher in
the coercive (M¼ 5.39, SE¼ 0.18) than in the legitimate authority
condition (M¼ 3.88, SE¼ 0.20). This is especially true if coercive
authority follows legitimate (for details on an interaction effect
see Supplementary Material). On the other hand, voluntary co-
operation was only affected by authority (F(1,77) ¼ 59.51, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.44), it was higher under legitimate (M¼ 4.65,
SE¼ 0.15) than coercive authority (M¼ 2.90, SE¼ 0.15). Also, ra-
tional decision-making was affected by authority (F(1,78)¼11.55, P
< 0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.13) and was higher under coercive (M¼ 5.00,
SE¼ 0.17) than legitimate authority (M¼ 4.35, SE¼ 0.18).
Reactance was also higher under coercive (M¼ 5.25, SE¼ 0.15)
than legitimate authority (M¼ 3.80, SE¼ 0.18; F(1,78) ¼ 81.77, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.51; for details see Supplementary Material).
Behavioral data. Tax compliance was significantly higher under
legitimate (F(1,78) ¼ 5.96, P ¼ 0.017, gp2 ¼ 0.07; M¼ 4.07; SE¼ 0.12)
than coercive authority (M¼ 3.77, SE¼ 0.14). Reaction times
were significantly affected by the contrast between coercive
and legitimate authority (F(1,78) ¼ 177.63, P < 0.001, gp2 ¼ 0.70).
Compared to time 1 (first 40 trials) (t(78) ¼ 1.05, P ¼ 0.295), at
time 2 (second 40 trials) (t(78) ¼ –1.97, P ¼ 0.052, d¼ 0.45) coer-
cive authority (M¼ 1784.67 ms, SE¼ 138.61) by trend yielded
faster responses than legitimate authority (M¼ 2230.02 ms,
SE¼ 138.98).
Discussion experiment 1
Corroborating previous studies, experiment 1 shows that a per-
ceived coercive compared to a legitimate authority led to less
Fig. 1. Differences in self-reports in experiment 1 and 2.
Note: The bars represent means with the standard error. T1 and T2 indicate whether the authority was presented first (T1, i.e. first 40 trials) or second (T2, i.e. second 40
trials). 1¼disagree, 7¼agree.
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voluntary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014). For enforced
compliance and reactance, we observed sensitivity to the
change from coercive to legitimate authority. More specifically,
legitimate authority’s negative effect on enforced compliance
and reactance was particularly strong when a legitimate au-
thority was perceived as the direct change following coercive
authority. Overall and in line with previous studies (e.g.
Hofmann et al., 2014), the effect sizes indicated that the differ-
ence between coercive and legitimate authority was the most
important factor affecting enforced compliance and reactance.
Results also showed that legitimate authority led to slightly
higher tax payments than coercive authority. Coercive authority
induced more self-reported rational decision-making than legit-
imate authority. However, reaction time results indicate that
the decision under coercive authority was quicker to reach com-
pared to legitimate authority. At time 2 (second 40 trials), coer-
cive authority led to faster reactions than legitimate authority.
Experiment 1 is one of the rare attempts showing that the dif-
ferent psychological meanings of coercive and legitimate au-
thority can also be detected by indirect measures of cognitive
processes such as reaction times. To clarify the exact nature of
these processes and how coercive and legitimate authority af-
fect them, data providing access to the temporal sequence and
different cognitive processes underlying decision-making and
behavior are needed. Therefore, our second experiment as-
sessed ERPs while participants made tax decisions under differ-
ent tax authorities.
Experiment 2
Method
Sample
The sample consisted of 81 volunteers of which three were
excluded because of limited task comprehension or excessive
alpha-band EEG activity (final sample: n¼ 78, 40 men, Mage ¼
24.51, SDage ¼ 5.05). All participants were right-handed (Oldfield,
1971), had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported
no past or present neurological or psychiatric disorder. All par-
ticipants gave written informed consent prior to the experi-
ment. Recruitment and ethical guidelines were comparable to
experiment 1. They were again randomly assigned to one of two
taxpaying conditions (coercive authority of tax administration
followed by legitimate authority [n¼ 38], or legitimate authority
followed by coercive authority [n¼ 40]).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated,
shielded chamber. As in experiment 1, they were asked to im-
agine being self-employed, earning income, and paying taxes
over several years. To ensure that participants understood the
instructions, they were led through a taxpaying example and
performed 10 training trials. Then, identical to experiment 1
(order counterbalanced), 40 coercive and 40 legitimate authority
trials followed. However, different to experiment 1, participants
were reminded every 5th trial to make the manipulation more
salient. Each trial started with the presentation of a white fix-
ation cross on black background (1000ms). Afterwards, the flag
of the respective country, the fictitious income, and the 40% tax
rate in total numbers were presented centrally on black back-
ground (3000 ms). Prior to the actual tax decision, another
screen was blended in asking ‘How much tax would you pay in
[current country]?’ (2000 ms). This slide was added to the ex-
perimental design to avoid fast responses to the tax decision as
in Experiment 1. Afterwards, participants were presented with
five options for taxpaying, either representing 0%, 25%, 50%,
75% or 100% of the 40% tax rate (absolute numbers). Participants
had to choose between the keys 1–5 on a standard keyboard to
indicate their tax decision via button press. No time limit was
given for their decision. A variable inter-stimulus-interval
(1400–1600 ms) was presented afterwards depicting the fixation
cross. After 40 trials in the first context, participants filled out
the first self-report questionnaire and were subsequently in-
formed that they would move to a different country with a dif-
ferent tax administration. After introducing the second context,
another 40 trials were presented applying the same experimen-
tal design as before, ending with filling out the second
self-report questionnaire. At the end, participants were remun-
erated based on a e10 show-up fee and their tax decision in one
randomly chosen tax trial (on average e22.12).
Material
The same material as in experiment 1 was used
(Supplementary Material 1.2.3).
EEG was recorded from 57 equidistantly arranged electrodes
in a cap. Signal preprocessing and artefact correction was con-
ducted using EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Please refer
to Supplementary Material for further details on data collection
and preprocessing (1.2.2).
To assess ERP amplitudes, data were epoched time-locked to
the onset of the income separately for coercive and legitimate
trials. MFN amplitudes were extracted at FCz as peak-to-peak-
to-peak values (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004); i.e. difference between
the MFN component and the mean of the preceding P2 and the
subsequent P300 component) in the time window 150–400 ms
post income. P300 amplitudes were extracted at Pz as peak-to-
peak values (Pfabigan et al., 2011); i.e. difference between the
P300 and the preceding N2 component in the time window 200–
600 ms post income.
Statistical analyses
Several 2 x 2 univariate analyses of variance with manipulation
of authority (coercive vs legitimate authority) as within-subjects
factors, and order of manipulation (coercive followed by legitim-
ate authority and vice versa) as between-subjects factor were
performed with self-report data, behavioral data, and P2, MFN
and P300 amplitudes as dependent variables. Again, we present
only significant results. Detailed results and robustness checks
are presented in Supplementary Material (1.2.4–6).
Results
Self-report data. As shown in Figure 1, self-reported enforced
compliance was again significantly higher under coercive
(M¼ 5.65, SE¼ 0.17) than legitimate authority (M¼ 4.13, SE¼ 0.20;
F(1,76) ¼ 50.78, P < 0.001, gp2 ¼ 0.40). Again, voluntary cooper-
ation was significantly higher under legitimate (M¼ 4.92,
SE¼ 0.14) than coercive authority (M¼ 3.03, SE¼ 0.15; F(1,76) ¼
103.11, P < 0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.58). Rational decision-making did not
differ between coercive and legitimate authority. Again, react-
ance was significantly higher under coercive (M¼ 5.18, SE¼ 0.17)
than legitimate authority (M¼ 3.79, SE¼ 0.18; F(1,75) ¼ 50.17, P <
0.001, gp
2 ¼ 0.40).
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Behavioral data. Tax payments were not affected by our experi-
mental manipulation (all P-values> 0.195). See Supplementary
Material 1.2.5 for descriptive statistics.
ERP data. P2 amplitudes were significantly more pronounced
under legitimate (M¼ 5.20, SE¼ 0.52) than coercive authority
(M¼ 4.13, SE¼ 0.58; F(1,76) ¼ 5.30, P ¼ 0.024, gp2 ¼ 0.07). As
Figure 2a indicates, MFN amplitudes were significantly more
pronounced under legitimate (M ¼ –9.35, SE¼ 0.54) than coercive
authority (M ¼ –8.27, SE¼ 0.56; F(1,76) ¼ 9.43, P ¼ 0.003, gp2 ¼
0.11). P300 amplitudes were significantly more pronounced
under coercive (M¼ 9.67, SE¼ 0.62) than legitimate authority
(M¼ 8.64, SE¼ 0.52; F(1,76) ¼ 6.81, P ¼ 0.010, gp2 ¼ 0.08). See
Supplementary Material 1.2.6 for descriptive statistics.
Discussion experiment 2
Experiment 2 confirmed most of the results of experiment 1,
apart from the absent differences in tax payments and self-
reported rational decision making. However, these absent dif-
ferences replicate existing findings (Hartl et al., 2015) and might
originate from the different settings in both experiments.
Concerning ERP data, results show that coercive authority dif-
ferentially affected attentional processing (P2, P300) and
reduced cognitive control demands (MFN) compared to legitim-
ate authority.
General discussion
We investigated whether or not coercive and legitimate central-
ized institutions elicit comparable cognitive and neuronal
processes to reach the final tax payment decision. In experi-
ment 1, coercive authority led to less tax payments, faster deci-
sions and more self-reported rational decision-making, and to
less voluntary cooperation than legitimate authority. In experi-
ment 2, no difference in tax payments and self-reported rational
decision-making was found. This can be due to differences in
experimental procedures, fostering less spontaneous decisions
in experiment 2. On the neuronal level, tax authority influenced
all ERPs. P2 and MFN amplitudes were more pronounced in le-
gitimate compared to coercive conditions, while P300 ampli-
tudes were more pronounced in coercive than legitimate ones.
In tax experiments which applied a similar paradigm, both
coercive and legitimate authority are shown to increase tax pay-
ments (Wahl et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2014; Hartl et al., 2015).
This, however, is based on different motivations. Coercive au-
thority was shown to lead to less trust in institutions, more
enforced compliance and less voluntary cooperation than legit-
imate authority (Hofmann et al., 2014). The different psycho-
logical processes underlying both types of authority might
explain why some previous studies (Hofmann et al., 2014) as
well as experiment 1 show that legitimate authority generates
higher tax payments than coercive authority. Enforced compli-
ance elicited by coercive authority reduces tax payments; vol-
untary cooperation based on legitimate authority increases tax
payments (Kastlunger et al., 2012; Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, par-
ticularly when individuals decide spontaneously these different
motivational processes related to voluntary cooperation and
enforced compliance might generate higher tax payments for
legitimate than for coercive authority.
In ultimatum game studies, enhanced MFN amplitudes are
usually observed after unfair compared to fair offers, and most
Fig. 2. (A) Time-courses of the P2 and MFN component at FCz (upper panel; also showing P300 peak used for peak quantification [Yeung and Sanfey, 2004]) and the P300
component at Pz (lower panel; also showing N2 peak used for peak quantification [Pfabigan et al., 2011]). Time point zero indicates onset of the flag, tax income, and
the 40% tax rate. Negative is drawn upwards per convention. (B) Scalp topographies of the mean difference between coercive and legitimate trials in the P2 time inter-
val (170–210 ms; left side), MFN time interval (260–300 ms; in the middle) and the P300 time interval (300–400 ms, right side). (C) Bar graph depicting mean and SE of P2,
MFN and P300 peak values per condition and time point. Please note that absolute values of the three ERPs (in mV) were plotted for a uniform display. Note: b2p¼base-
to-peak; p2p¼peak-to-peak; p2p2p¼peak-to-peak-to-peak approaches for ERP quantification.
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likely reflect fairness-related norm enforcement in these situ-
ations (Feng et al., 2015). Along these lines, Fehr and Camerer
(2007) reported that unfair offers in economic games induce mo-
tivational response conflict between economic self-interest and
norm enforcement. MFN amplitude variation in the current
study might therefore reflect enhanced response conflict
induced by legitimate compared to coercive tax authority since
evading tax might be perceived as more conflicting in the legit-
imate than the coercive context because of moral pressure to
pursue community goals on costs of egoistic motives.
Legitimate authority is likely perceived as positive and as
community-serving, which in turn calls for reciprocity (Fehr
et al., 1997; Tyler and Fagan, 2008), mirrored by enhanced volun-
tary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014). Thus, MFN and volun-
tary cooperation data indicate that legitimate authority might
make it more difficult to defect than coercive authority.
Moreover, we observed significantly larger P2 amplitudes during
legitimate than coercive trials. This further corroborates the
MFN results. Thus, even before indicating response conflict by
MFN variation, legitimate tax authority stimuli induced height-
ened arousal levels (Carretie´ et al., 2001) or higher attention cap-
ture (Potts, 2004) than coercive tax stimuli.
In contrast to the early evaluation indicated by P2 and MFN
components, enhanced P300 amplitudes were observed in coer-
cive compared to legitimate trials. This finding suggests at first
glance that coercive authority might yield greater evaluative
changes and attention (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito et al., 1998;
Polich, 2007), which disagrees with a simple calculative cost-
benefit heuristic. However, Fabre et al. (2015) proposed that
larger P300 amplitudes during asset distribution might reflect
more automatic processing in line with simple heuristics in
working memory (Khader et al., 2011), while decreased ampli-
tudes might reflect a disruption of heuristic-driven processing.
For example, P300 amplitudes are larger for fair compared to
conflicting unfair and mid-fair proposals (Hewig et al., 2011; Wu
et al., 2012; Qu et al., 2013). Also, in dual-task settings, P300 amp-
litudes are larger in the main task if the second task is an easy
compared to a difficult cognitive task (Kramer et al., 1985).
Therefore, we belief that legitimate compared to coercive au-
thority is related to a rather difficult decision conflict which dis-
rupts also stimulus categorization (mirrored in P300 decrease).
Faster decisions in experiment 1 in the coercive condition
also indicate that a simple calculative cost-benefit analysis
might represent an easy-to-apply cognitive heuristic, which is
processed faster than the response conflict induced by reci-
procity during legitimate authority. Thus, our findings indicate
that tax decisions under coercive authority were processed
more easily than under legitimate authority.
Self-reported rational decision-making was enhanced under
coercive compared to legitimate authority in experiment 1.
However, no such difference was observed in experiment 2.
Although reaction time and ERP data indicate that the legitim-
ate condition is the more complex one, this self-report finding
suggests that the decision complexity under legitimate author-
ity was not consciously perceived by the participants. The dif-
ferent experimental settings might be partly responsible for
this. The rather spontaneous tax decision in experiment 1
might have led to more conscious cognitive workload in the co-
ercive than in the legitimate condition. In contrast, the experi-
mentally prolonged tax decision in experiment 2 might have
reduced the conscious workload for coercive compared to legit-
imate authority. Alternatively, the rational decision-making
scale might not be able to differentiate between simple calcula-
tive cost-benefit analysis and deliberate decisions about the
social consequences of one’s decision. The present results sug-
gest that both, coercive and legitimate authority, lead to deliber-
ate considerations, but with varying cognitive demands.
Concerning our opposing hypotheses, we found that coer-
cive authority induces simpler calculative cost-benefit analysis
instead of more complex social evaluation processes, which in
turn make it less conflicting to defect under coercive compared
to legitimate authority (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999).
Surprisingly, the hypothesis that the cost-benefit analysis
induced by coercive authority is more complex than the tax de-
cision under legitimate authority is not supported by our data.
Relating our findings to previous literature (Coricelli et al., 2010;
Dulleck et al., 2016) suggests that coercive authority might in-
duce less deliberate and less emotional demands compared to
legitimate authority, which might provoke a straining conflict
on reciprocity and fairness accompanied by psychological
stress. Thus, coercive and not legitimate authority might pro-
voke more instinctive economic choices (Rubinstein, 2007) and
allows a fast calculative response whereas legitimate authority
introduces a complex conflict between self- and social interests.
Our finding that legitimate authority leads to more fairness-
related response conflict might also serve as explanation for
why legitimate authority sometimes leads to higher tax pay-
ments than coercive authority (e.g. when spontaneous deci-
sions are made such as in experiment 1 and Hofmann et al.,
2014). Legitimate more than coercive authority might trigger
and explain individuals’ tax morale (Frey and Torgler, 2007).
Taxpaying is an excellent example for social decision-
making and implies financial decisions which affect both self-
interest and other-orientation (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Several
authors suggested that a dual-process system is at work during
decision-making reflecting the interplay of self-interest vs
other-orientation (see Sanfey and Chang, 2008). System 1 is
assumed to represent an automatic, fast, effortless, uncon-
scious and slow-learning system implementing automatic and
heuristic-based judgements. Contrarily, system 2 is assumed to
represent a controlled, slow, effortful and fast-learning system
implementing more deliberate reasoning and potentially reap-
praising input from system 1, and balancing competing inter-
ests. Thus, the question arises whether tax decisions under
coercive and legitimate authorities are purely based on
heuristic-based judgments (system 1) or involve more deliberate
reasoning (system 2). The calculative cost-benefit analysis as a
heuristic might be used to easily assess self-interests, while so-
cial norm enforcement might be reflective of other-orientation.
Enhanced MFN amplitudes during legitimate compared to coer-
cive trials might reflect system 1 activity, since MFN variation
usually reflects automatic, coarse stimulus evaluation (Hajcak
et al., 2006)–indicating enhanced response conflict between self-
and other-interests. Subsequent P300 variation indicates that
participants might have countered system 1 and tried to costly
implement more deliberative reasoning during legitimate trials
resulting in diminished P300 amplitudes compared to coercive
trials (Fabre et al., 2015).
Limitations of the current study concern the consequences of
the necessary compromise between research methods in tax
psychology and neuroscience. The experimental setting (within-
subject design), number of assessed trials (40) and the assess-
ment of tax decisions (5-point Likert-type scale) deviates from
the standard tax paradigms but was necessary to meet the re-
quirements of EEG measurement. However, replication of the ef-
fects of coercive and legitimate authority on enforced compliance
and voluntary cooperation (Hofmann et al., 2014) show that the
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present experiments can be compared with previous ones, pro-
viding evidence for the internal validity of the present results.
Future studies on cognitive and neuronal processes involved
in tax decisions should examine more realistic settings by ana-
lyzing the impact of a combination of high vs low coercive with
high vs low legitimate authority on cooperation (Hartl et al.,
2015). Moreover, trust is argued to be as important for cooper-
ation as coercive and legitimate authority (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Cooperation in social systems is organized by centralized in-
stitutions such as tax administrations which aim to motivate
tax honesty. The present experiments are the first attempt of
generating insights into psychological, cognitive and neuronal
processes involved in taxpaying under coercive or legitimate
authority. Our results also have policy implications: legitimate
compared to coercive authority makes tax compliance to a com-
plex social instead of a simple economic problem, thus should
be a preferred strategy of tax administrations to foster general
tax morale. A better understanding of tax compliance might
help to ensure sufficient funds for public goods and might in-
crease public confidence if all taxpayers are perceived to con-
tribute their fair share instead of exploiting the system.
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